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Abstract: During the first decade after the end of the War, the economic situa-
tion of the Belgian universities and scientific institutions had greatly deteriorated.
Books and equipment had become more expensive, and official budgets had not
been able to keep up with rising prices. A professor's salary was relatively small, and
it was lamented that only few young people were willing to pursue a career in sci-
ence. A turning point was reached with the creation of the Belgian Fonds National
de Recherche Scientifique in April 1928, after a nationwide fundraising campaign
had brought together over 100 million francs in only a few months. The success
of the Fonds was largely due to the efforts of Emile Francqui, head of the Société
Générale, a holding controlling much of Belgian industry. The role of the Belgian
government in the creation of the Fonds was only secondary, if not absent. In this
paper we will look at the debates in Belgium with regard to the political support of
scientific research, and to what extent an innovative Belgian science policy indeed
came into being in the interwar period.
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In his study of the historical development of Dutch science policy, Frits Henry
Brookman made a useful distinction between several definitions of science policy,
relevant to the study of its historical development'. Science policy could range
from the promotion of scientific education and the instrumentalisation of scientific
knowledge for politics ('science for policy') to the use of scientific research in mak-
ing or implementing political decisions (tcience in policy'); from the adherence
to scientific principles in framing general policies or the legitimation of political re-
gimes ('political scientism') to the moral and financial support of scientific research,
either for the benefit of government policies or in the general interest of civilization
('policy for science'). All of these definitions apply to the interaction of scientific
and political elites, but in particular since World War I the term 'science policy' has
been increasingly used to denote the political support and management of scientific
research, and the integration of science in the attainment of political goals, in par-
ticular with respect to economic and industrial growth. Underlying this definition
is the notion that science is a crucial precondition for industrial development, that
the promotion of science can and will make a substantial contribution to economic
growth, and that the support of science is a moral obligation for the state.
In this paper we will study the creation of the Belgian National Fund for
Scientific Research, often considered as the starting point of Belgian science policy.
Its main goal was the support of scientific research as a means to strengthen the in-
dustrial basis of the nation. A closer analysis of some of the contemporary debates
will reveal, however, that the objectives of the National Fund were less innovative
than is usually accepted. In particular, although industrial and financial circles were
heavily involved in the creation of the National Fund, the results did not yield many
benefits for Belgian industry. The creation of the National Fund was more of a re-
turn to a prewar period of scientific elitism, than it was the beginning of a new era of
science-based innovation.
In the analysis of science policy, it has become a habit to comment critically
on the so-called 'linear model of innovationl This model implies that basic science
is the fundamental source of innovation, and that the process of innovation flows
from pure to applied research, and hence to product development and dissemina-
tion. The alleged origin of this model is found in Vannevar Busht famous pamphlet
Science: The Endless Frontier (1945), in which he warned U.S. government that with-
out the political support of basic research technological progress would become
t (BROOKMAN, t979 : 224-24O and 256-27 4).
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impossible. As Bush phrased it: "Basic research is the pacemaker of technological
progress." Although at first glance, Busht appeal is a clear formulation of the link
between basic science and applied science, David Edgerton has maintained how-
ever, that this cannot be equated with the linear model2. To him, the view professed
by Bush merely hints at the fact that basic research will lead to an increase in the
reservoir of knowledge, but not that it was connected in any more explicit way to the
innovation process itself. In particular, Edgerton points out that historians studying
science policy should make a distinction between science and research. It cannot be
taken for granted that every scientist in the first half of the twentieth centurywould
consider himself to be a researcher, nor that even the goal of academic science would
be to make discoveries. Of course, a scientist couldbe expected to give expert advice,
but to many contemporary observers, there was no direct sequential chain from aca-
demic science to industrial innovation.
It is good to keep these remarks in mind before analyzing the development of
a science policy in Belgium. In public discourse, this science policy was heralded as
a major step in the restoration effort of the nation after the war. Science was con-
sidered a source of prosperity and industrial development. It was supported by the
major industrial and financial groups in the country. Yet, the main target of Belgian
science policy before 1940 was merely the support and expansion of academic sci-
ence, and in the end financial funding was controlled by the universities - not by
industry. This was not the result of a misguided or failed policy, but rather the con-
sequence of a non-research view of academic science, as described by Edgerton. As
such, it was the continuation of nineteenth century concePtions, although the new
science policy of the 1920's did step back from the traditional non-interventionist
attitude of Belgian government.
FNRS-FWO
In 2008, the Belgian Fonds National de Recherche scientifique - since 1992 re-
organized in two regional institutions in accordance to the linguistic structure of
the nation, FWO Vlaanderen en FNRS 
- 
celebrated its 80th birthday. Founded in
Aprll 1928, the FNRS has been and still is the cornerstone of Belgian science poli-
cy. In 2010, FWO-Vlaanderen could spend 190 million euro on scientific research
'z(EDGERToN,2004). see also (cootry zoo6).
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activities and its Francophone counterpart FNRS 160 million. In comparison, in
2008 federal spending on science policy, including the cost of federal scientific in-
stitutions and international programs was just under 600 million euro, but only 100
million of this was given to scientific research. AfterWorldWar II, a second Fund for
Applied Research was created, which today in Flanders alone can distribute some
300 million euro on R&D to universities and industry. For basic research, however,
the FNRS-FWO remains the most important source of funding.
Given the central role of FNRS, it is amazing that there are very few historical
studies of available. rn 1978, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary, a small volume
with original historical papers was published, which still form the basis of our cur-
rent scholarshipl. More recently, Kenneth Bertrams has reviewed the early history
of the FNRS in the context of his analysis of science-industry relations in Belgiuma.
In 2008 Robert Halleux and Geneviève Xhayet published the official anniversary
volume of the FNRS, which will serve as point of reference for future historical re-
searchs. The narratives presented in these publications are to some extent quite simi-
lar: the FNRS was created as an immediate consequence of a well-received speech
given by King Albert r in 1927 ; it was funded by the main industrial companies and
banks (as well as many individual donators); and it was directed towards the promo-
tion of fundamental research, mainly to the benefit of the universities. These con-
clusions bring out the main players, constituting a truly triple helix: government,
industry and universities. The successful creation of the FNRS was the outcome
of a salutary alignment of these three players, but also raises questions on how this
alignment was forged. Already in the early years of the FNRS it became clear that
the scientific research funded by the FNRS would not be of much direct benefit to
Belgian industry. Furthermore, the Belgian government remained singularly aloof
of any intervention in the work of the FNRS. The Belgian state only became in-
volved after world war II. What were the guiding lines of Belgian science policy in
the interwar period and how did they relate to the history of FNRS? Finally, it is not
entirely clear what the effect of the FNRS funding was on universities. Did it affect
the creation of new scientific disciplines? Did it foster international collaboration?
How did it influence the career ofyoung scientists?
3 (r.Lr.R.s. 1928- 1978: 197 8).
4 (nrnrReus,2006). See also (BERTRAMS, zooTb).
s (HAILEUX and Xhayet, 2007).
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This paper will raise more questions than it can provide answers. It will try to
bring out the different perceptions of the parties involved in the early history of
FNRS. In particular, we will attempt to put the creation of FNRS in the perspective
of scientific culture in Belgium during the interwar period.
The royal initiative
There are two main interpretations on the background forces leading to the cre-
ation of the FNRS. The'royalist'interpretation is given by Halleux and Xhayet, and
widely referred to in the secondary literature. This interpretation emphasizes the
crucial role of King Albert I ( 1875- I%4) , not only in delivering his famous speech
in 1927, which had an almost instantaneous impact on hundreds of donators, but
also in offering a constant legitimation for scientists and industrialists promoting the
support of scientific research. Kenneth Bertram has proposed, following the lead of
Liliane Ranieri6, a second interpretation in which the frame of reference is shifted
towards Emile Francqui (1863-1935), a powerful figure in Belgian financial and
industrial circles. Both interpretations are not incompatible with each other: there
were many close links between the two men. But the narratives constructed around
the two interpretations bring different questions to the foreground and hides others
from view. A confrontation of both interpretations will make this clear.
On 1 October 1927, King Albert addressed a large audience of industrial and
political leaders in Seraing, on the occasion of the 110th anniversary of the Usines
Cockerill, the leading metallurgical company in Belgium. During the war, the fac-
tory had been closed and dismantled by the German regime, but it had recovered
remarkably well since then. The King honored its founderJohn Cockerill, and the
people who had surrounded or succeeded him, in particular engineers, workers and
industrialists. Then, suddenly, he changed the theme of his discourse: from lauding
the intelligence and energy of the earlier generations, he turned towards the present
day challenges of industry.
"It is in the research laboratories that the rudiments of future industries are
worked out, and yet, one cannot but feel troubled when looking at the poor means
which our men of science have at their disposal today. In Belgium, there is a true
crisis of scientific institutions and laboratories, and the economic problems caused
6 (RANrEzu, r978)
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by the war and after the war have made it impossible for public authorities to take
by themselves the decisive and radical measures which are necessary to remedy this
evil. The public in our country does not understand enough that pure science is
the indispensable condition for applied science, and that the future of nations who
neglect science and scientists is marked by decadence. [ .. . ] I am convinced that the
industrial elite who is listening to me, will perfectly understand. I ask all of those
who form this elite, to think of our universities, our engineering schools, our labora-
tories. The field is wide open in this domain for private initiative. Inspired by some
well-known examples but less frequently adopted in Belgium than in some foreign
countries, we must all together find the practical means to promote science and to
encourage the researchers and scholars."T
The reaction was overwhelming. The discourse was published in its entirety in
several newspapers, and the reasons for the bad state of Belgian science were dis-
cussed from various ideological points of vieud. On the 26th November, the King
held a second speech at the National Academy, repeating his plea for the support of
science: "Science is a source of prosperity, but she herself is poor'l At the same time
he announced a project for the creation of a National Fund for Scientific Research,
and a propaganda committee was set up to collect the necessary funds. The Solvay
family donated 25 million francs and within the following months a total of rLZ
million francs was brought together. The list of donators consisted of some 1,200
names, from large companies and banks, to local societies and individual citizens.
The statutes of the FNRS were officially adopted on27 April1928 and the Royal
Decree was published on 2June.
This sequence of events suggests a strong driving impulse from the King.
Indeed, King Albert, who had studied at the Military School, held a keen interest
in science and technologyr. His friendship with Albert Einstein, who was a frequent
guest at the Royal Palace, is only one example ofhis general enthusiasm for scientific
progress. Historians agree that KingAlbert did write his own speeches, undoubtedly
after long deliberations with his entourage. His edification of science as a source of
prosperity was not new, nor was it very original. Albert considered science an im-
portant element of Belgiumt colonial "mission of civilization' in Congg for which
a wide network of laboratories was set up. He also considered science a domain of
7 The text of the discourse can be found in manyplaces, e.g. (HaILEUX et al., 2001).
8 (HAILEUX and Xhayet: ZOOT : 3134).
e (WtneqUI,T, D78); (qUINTYN and provoost, 1976).
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union and concord, an element of peace, with a high moral value. But the connec-
tion between pure science and applied science, as proclaimed in his 1927 address,
was a less familiar theme. Yet, what exactly he had in mind, is difficult to reconstruct.
Nobody would deny, of course, that science was important to modern industrial
progress, but exactly how academic laboratories and pure science were related to
industrial research and product development was less clear. Apparently, the labo-
ratories played a central role in this, as they were singled out by King Albert among
the scientific institutions as sites of research. Furthermore, according to the Kingr
the connection between science and industry had to be made by private initiative,
both because the State did not possess the means to do so, but also because this was
in line with what happened in other countries. Albert does not explicitly mention
any of these examples. He may have been referring to the French Olfice National des
recherches scientiJiques et industrielles et des inventions (founded ín 1922), the English
Department oJ Scientific and Industrial Research (tlt6), the National Research Fund
(LOZS) in the United States, or the Italian Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (l9B).
Or he may have been thinking of contract research between individual companies
and academic instÍtutions. Qrite probably, Albert was not hinting at a direct connec-
tion: he pleaded for the support ofpure science in the interest of industry 
- 
without
specifying how the interest ofindustry could be served by pure science. In a letter
to Francqui, shortly after his Seraing Address, he stipulated: "Some people, in par-
ticular the press, thought that it was my idea to create new laboratories or practical
organizations of an industrial or professional nature; while in fact, one should en-
courage pure scientific research, which is in the interest of industry itself, as is shown
by examples in the most advanced countries."r0 ForAlbert, his general confidence in
the benefits brought by science seemed to be enough to legitimate the creation of
Fund for financial support.
The support of academic science
The debate on the support of science and industry did not originate with the
Seraing Address. On the contrary, since the end of the war there had been an con-
tinuous debate on science, industry and educations. In general politicians were
quite convinced of the importance of science for the redress of the nation, and the
ro qroted in (RANIEzu, 1978: 34-35).
-lO 
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universities installed new education programs for applied sciences. The atmosphere
was optimistic and the 'German model' of a science-based industry was taken as an
example, notwithstanding the anti-German climate in the aftermath of the warr. But
despite the patriotic enthusiasm for the support ofscience and the need to develop
Belgian industry in the rebuilding of the natiory the dominant form of connection be-
tween academic science and industry in Belgium was at the time limited to personal
contacts, mainly between the engineering schools (attached to the universities) and
industrial companies. In the years after the war, when infrastructure was still difÍi-
cult to come by for companies, some voices proposed to open university laboratories
for industrial researc[ which would provide the universities with extra income and
would not make it necessary for industries to build their own expensive facilities. But
forvarious reasons, these initiatives were not realized, mainly as a result ofthe opposi-
tion of university boards. The universities held on to their academic mission of edu-
cating students in the proper ways of scientific thought. Bertrams explains this reac-
tion of the universities by pointing out that the need for applied scientific research was
more felt within industrial circles than the desire among academics to gain industrial
support for the universityl2. There was even an outspoken fear that scientific research
would come under the influence of billionaires, as it was reported to be already the
case in the United States (Annales Parlementaires, lSJune 1930). Belgian universities
did not turn to industry for extra income. State support was a more reliable source of
funding, and better in line with the traditional conception of the university mission.
The annual subsidies allotted to the two state Universities (Ghent and Liège), tripled
Írom 1920 to 1928, reaching a total of 39 million francs in 1930, not including special
costs for the building or installation of laboratories, etc. Also the two private universi-
ties (Leuven and Brussels) received annual state subsidies of 10 million francs each.
If read attentively, King Albert's speech was not a blueprint for a new science
policy. Although the outcome of his speech 
- 
the creation of the FNRS 
- 
may be
seen as the start of a newphase in the organization ofBelgian research, this was prob-
ably not in his original intentions. But his words provided the legitimation for a pro-
-science movement, which was in the making for many years. others immediately
seized upon the momentum created by the royal speech and in a short time created
a completely new organization. The central figure was Emile Francqui, together with
a group of like-minded industrialists, scientists and administrators.
r1 (oNGurNa,2ott).
12 (BERTRAMS, 20o6: t97)
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The career of Emile Francqui is quite unusual. He was an utterly self-made mary
and difficult to assign a place in the cultural landscape of Belgium. Born in Brussels,
he entered the Military School at the age of fourteen, where he would later serve
as an instructor to the future King Albert I. Twice he was sent on an expedition
to Congo, which brought him to the attention of King Leopold II. This lead him
to enter a business career, contributing to the industrial and commercial expansion
of Belgium in the world. For several years he worked in China, where he met the
American engineer Herbert Hoover, the future president of the United States. Back
in Belgium Francqui became a member of the board of the Banque d'Outremer, and
in L9l2 also of the Société Générale, the most important financial holding controlling
much of Belgian industry. During the war Francqui became involved in the securing
of food provisions for the Belgian people during the occupation. As the leader of
the Comité National de Secours et dAlimentation,he collaborated again with Herbert
Hoover, who was president of the Commission for Relief in Belgium. Their collabora-
tion was very successful, and already during the war it became clear that some large
financial reserves were being assembled. There seems to have been some reluctance
to hand over this money to the Belgian government 
- 
after alf some of the money
had been paid by the government, but some of the money was the result of dona-
tions from other sources. As early as 19Ió, Francqui consulted with university rep-
resentatives on the possibilities to use the money for the support of Belgian univer-
sities. No conclusion was reached, but from then on the support of science was on
the agenda. After the war, Francqui cleverly induced Hoover to donate 150 million
francs to the Belgian state, with the explicit mention to spend it on the redress of the
Belgian universities and on the creation of a University Foundation (inaugurated in
1922) for the coordination ofscientific research, the financing ofscientific publica-
tions and the awarding of travel grantsr3.
The reasons for this support of academic science are not clear, and they went
not without controversy. The socialist politician Georges Hubin (tS0:-tf+Z) held
that in order to rebuild the devastated country it was absolutely necessary that the
true scientific method would be applied to the production processes. He acknowl-
edged that the science taught at the universities was adapted to the level of indus-
trial development. "Yet, it can be said that between the scientific education as it is
understood at the universities, and the industrial practice, there is an empty space,
a dissolved continuity. [ .. . ] W" have to recognize that it is not enough that science
'3 (srRTRAMs, zoro)
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is taught in various universities. We need a scientific and industrial atmosphere 
- 
I
emPhasize this two associated words 
- 
to grow in a special institution. The Germans
have grasped this idea very well. They had, even more than we, universities built on
the classical structure, but this has not impeded them from establishing higher insti-
tutes for industrial science, that have contributed for a very important part to the de-
velopment of their industriesl' (Annales Parlementaires, rl september lglg). Hubin
indeed proposed to use the millions of Hoover for the creation of an institute for
applied sciences, where laboratories would be at the disposal of any researcher with
a good idea and a concrete research proposal. science would not simply be applied
to industrial Processes; there would also be an important contribution oíindustrial
ingenuity to science education. But Hubint ideas were not widely shared. In fact,
during the interwar years, criticism of the science education system in Belgium with
regard to its relation with industrywas almost non-existent. The need for intermedi-
ate institutes or laboratories was not put on the agenda. Furthermore, not everyone
was convinced of the possibility of scientists to work within an industrial context.
A political initiative, the creation of a Conseil National Belge de Recherches did not
materialize. The Belgian Prime Minister Léon Delacroix observed:
"To state it clearly, I have no absolute faith in the reallyuseful effects to be expected
from any official collaboration of a great number of scientists, industrialists and
technical administrators, who, subdivided along the major branches of science,
would have it as their mission to investigate the problems in the laboratories built
and maintained on the expense of the state, and to inform and consult, after they
have reached results, our industrialists about the progress to be made in their fac-
tories in all aspects: tools, working methods, choice ofbasic resources, etc."ra
The orientation given by Francqui to science policy was not directed towards
applied or industrial science, but to the reinforcement of the existing university
structure. This squared very well with the after war preoccupation of the Belgian
government and Belgian public opinion concerning the restoration of Belgian soci-
ety and culturers. It became a commonplace in the annual debates on the budget of
the Ministry of Science and Arts to lament the difficult situation of the universities.
rn1927, the catholic senator Georges Rutten (tszs-trsz) observed that the price
14 (nrRTnalts, zoo7 : 5t-7 s).
ls (truoINE, rgzz).
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of books and instruments had increased 10 times since 1914, while the financial re-
sources ofthe State universities had only been raised by a factor 2,5. Consequently,
"our universities and scientific societies find it impossible to place the necessary
means at the disposal of their researchers."(Annales Parlementaires. Sénat. 10 May
l9Z7). The value of academic science was beyond dispute. Science regarded as a
necessary element of culture, unity and social progress. Its contribution to applied
science and industry was only implicitly hinted at and probably taken for granted
without further ado.
To increase the basin of knowledge
The idea of a "linear model" cannot be found in Belgian political circles in this
period. But also the views of industrialists, who called for industry-related scientific
research, did not see a direct link from pure to applied science. A report, prepared by
the Comité national de chimíe ín 1927 dismissed the creation of special laboratories
as a means to further industrial applications, but pleaded for the use of university
laboratories for industrial research. Although the director of a university laboratory
remained free at all times to direct the researches within his own institution, an in-
dustrialist might negotiate with him to perform scientific investigations that were
not possible in his own industrial facilities. Of 44 laboratories questioned by the
Comité national,32 agreedto such a scheme. This report, which prefigured the work
of the FNRS, did not make mention of new facilities or a reorientation of the nature
of research towards industrial applications. The projected organization reinforced
once more the existing situation of university laboratories, by enlarging their scope
of action into industrial research, but without losing in any way the autonomy of
academic research. Moreover, the type of research envisaged in the report seemed to
hint more at a form of expert consultancy than at innovative research.
A more detailed account of how university laboratories were to work with in-
dustry, was given byJean Willems, the first director of the FNRS. He saw three pos-
sible scenarios. "The first is one in which an industrial comPany on its own decides
to call on the FNRS for tests or research of direct use for the improvement of its
products. These works would of course lead to a Patent in property of the company.
In this case the support of the FNRS would not be justified" as the company would
only be pursuing good management practices. Willems continued: "Second case: a
group of industrial companies wants to carry out scientific research, of which the
results would have immediate or long term industrial applications." In this case,
14 
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the FNRS, in which the best qualified representatives of Belgian science are to be
brought together, could give advice as to how this particular research could best be
set up. "Finally, the third case concerns research with obvious general interest. These
problems are verybroad and do not interest only one or other group ofindustrialists,
but industry as a whole. The FNRS should study these problems, investigate how a
plan of research could be drawn and which means are the most suited. undoubtedly,
in this case, we will see the creation of mixed studygroups, bringing together men of
science and representatives of the principal industries involved."16
In willems'view, the FRNS would act as a scientific body to organize collab-
orative research between academic scientists and industry, but only for matters of
broad, general interest. The initiative of the research would come from industry,
but the benefits for industry were only vaguely defined. In cases where product im-
provements or patents were involved, Willems did not see a large role for the FNRS.
Academic science would be at the service of industry if called upon, but did not have
to adapt to industrial demands.
The actual organization of the FNRS was clearly set up to promote academic
research. It was not integrated into the system of state laboratories which had devel-
oped since the late nineteenth centuryrT. Its general mission was to "promote scien-
tific research in Belgium'l by "liberating the researcher of material worries, by helping
him in the furthering of his career and to stimulate scientific vocations." The FRNS
would Pay young researchers at the beginning of their career and finance research
projects and scientific voyages. Also it would contribute to the purchase of labora-
tory instruments, and it could finance by its own initiative certain large projects.
Finally, the FRNS would serve as the interlocutor of the scientific communitywith
regard to the general state of research in Belgium. It was explicitly stated that the
FRNS would not take the place of the universities, nor that it would act as a parallel
research institute. It did not possess its own laboratories or research facilities, so that
the funding in effect went to the existing research institutes, mainly at the universi-
ties. The FNRS was not to be limited to the natural sciences; also research projects
in the humanities and social sciences were taken in consideration. During the first
tenyears,30% ofallresearchers (168) appointedasaspiranf oftheFNRS camefrom
the humanities, compared to 36% from exact sciences, l7o/o from medical sciences
16 (Ha]LEUX and Xhayet, 2007:82-83).
t7 (DISER,20tr).
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and only 16o/o from applied sciences (including agriculture and economics)18. One
cannot but conclude that the universities were the main beneficiaries of the FNRS.
They were also largely represented within its boards and committeesre.
So what happened to the often announced collaboration between academic
science and industry? After all, the financial resources of the FNRS were mainly
brought together by bankers and industrialists, and they had legitimate expectations
that the new organization would yield economic results. Very soon after the crea-
tion of the FNRS, a huge controversy was raised on the very first scientific project
funded by the FNRS: a scientific mission to Syria to inquiry into the opportuni-
ties for archeological excavations. To some, the choice of this project marked the
indifference of the FNRS towards the needs oíBelgian industry2o. The organization
of the FNRS provided two opportunities for industry to have an impact on the di-
rection of research. On the one hand, industrialists could become member of the
Administrative Board or the scientific committees of the FNRS, but very few did.
Bertrams has calculated that from 1928 until 1963, a mere 9.3o/o of all administra-
tors were appointed in their quality as industrialist2l. As before, the collaboration
between science and industry depended on the willingness of individual scientists
to enter into a project with industry. The second opportunity was the creation of a
separate body within the FNRS, the Commission mixte Science-lndusfríe, instituted in
July 192922. The Commission indeed fully answered the expectations created before
the foundation of the FNRS, but its importance within the organization was small.
On average only l7o/o of total expenses were bestowed on industrial projects. Even
more telling is the amount of subsidies demanded and obtained by academic and
industrial projects. Whereas the industrial projects submitted on average amounted
to about three quarters of the subsidies demanded by academic projects (in several
years the industrial demands even exceeded the academic projects), the actual fund-
ing for industrial projects was only one fifth of the academic projects. These num-
bers did not cause the FNRS to review its policy. Even during the economic crisis of
the mid-1930t, scientific collaboration with industry was not particularly stimulat-
ed. A cynical interpretation might suggest that the Commission was actually created
to separate academic projects from the influence of industrial debates. The FNRS
t8 (HAILEUX and Xhayet, 2007: 59).
Ie (BArrHAZAR,1978).
20 (BEGHIN, 1939: vii).
21 (BERTRAM s, 20o6 : 223),
,, (BEGHIN, 1939).
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remained a strictly university organization and the critical voices from industrialists
would continue being heard.
Science policy and the scientific researcher
Did the foundation of the FNRS bring about a new phase in the history of sci-
ence policy in Belgium? Halleux and Xhayet maintain that it did anticipate a science
policy to come23. The FNRS assumed several new roles in the scientific landscape.
It acted as an bbservatory of science', collecting information on scientific research
and advising the government on policy issues concerning e.g. the career of young
researchers, The FNRS also represented Belgian science on the international scene,
e.g. by participating in the international polar year of 1932. But none of these func-
tions were actually new. In the nineteenth century, similar functions were fulfilled
by the Royal Academy for Science, Letters and Arts and to some extent they still
were at the time. The main difference between the FNRS and the Academywas the
large financial support the FNRS was able to give, whereas the Academy only served
as a forum for scientific debate and public representation. In general, the scientific
climate in Belgium in the immediate aftermath of World War I was much related to
the pre-war optimistic beliefs in science and technology, of which it continued the
general approach to science policr/a.
The real innovation of the FNRS, however, was the creation of the paid scien-
tific researcher, and with it the emergence of the universities as research centers2s.
Young students were now in a position to start a scientific career by doing paid re-
search in attendance of an official nomination at a university. Professors learned how
to formulate short term research projects and to apply for financial support. The uni-
versities were indeed quick to make use of the new resources offered by the FNRS.
Although the FNRS in its early history did not change the nature of academic re-
search, and certainlywas not the expression of anylinear model of innovation, it did
bring into existence a scientific community that was reared on a system of subsidies
and short term projects 
- 
a system which after the Second World War would grow
into a modern science policy.
23 (HAILEUX and Xhayet, 2007: 59-$).
24 (ONGHENA, 2ol t: 3oo).
2s (ntRTRant S, 2oo7 a: 7 1 -7 2).
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